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MUST THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE
HAVE A PERSONAL CAUSE?:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE KALAM
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Wes Morriston
The aim of this paper is to take a close look at some little discussed aspects of the
kalam cosmological argument, with a view to deciding whether there is any reason to believe the causal principle on which it rests ("Whatever begins to exist
must have a cause"), and also with a view to determining what conclusions can
be drawn about the nature of the First Cause of the universe (supposing that
there is one). I am particularly concerned with the problems that arise when it is
assumed (as it often is) that that the First Cause is timeless and that it timelessly
creates time. I argue that this forces the defender of the kalam argument to analyze the concept of "beginning to exist" in a way that raises series doubts about
its main causal principle, and that it also undercuts the main argument for saying that the cause of the universe must be a person.

At first glance, the kalam argument appears to have several advantages
over other cosmological arguments. Not only does it support the orthodox
contention that the universe was created in time, but the concepts and
principles on which it relies are, at least superficially, clearer and more
straightforward than those involved in, say, the Leibnizian argument from
contingency. Whereas Leibniz's argument depends on the questionable
assumption that there must be a sufficient reason for anything and everything, the kalam argument relies instead on the more modest - and seemingly more plausible - claim that whatever begins to be must have been
brought into being by some cause outside itself. Given this causal principle,
the advocate of the kalam argument has a simple and obvious response to
the beginner's question, "So what caused the First Cause?" Whereas the
defender of the Leibnizian argument must appeal to the relatively obscure
idea of a self-existent being that somehow "contains the reason of its own
existence," the defender of the kalam argument can simply say: "God doesn't need a cause, because he is eternal - unlike the universe, God didn't
begin to be."
The aim of the present paper is to take a close look at the kalam argument, with a view to deciding whether the argument is sound, and
whether the advantages just mentioned can withstand critical scrutiny. I
shall be particularly concerned with the cogency of the causal principle on
which the argument rests ("Whatever begins to exist must have a cause"),
with the relation that is alleged to hold between the First Cause and the
universe, and with the implications for the nature of the First Cause.
Since William Lane Craig has done more than anyone else to bring the
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kalam argument to the attention of contemporary philosophers, I will discuss
his version of the argument. Craig's argument has a very simple structure.
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
As we shall see later, Craig regards the first premise as intuitively obvious. Most of his effort is devoted to the defense of premise (2). Craig gives
two main philosophical arguments for saying that the universe has not
always existed - one based on the supposed impossibility of an actual infinite, the other based on the claim that even if an actual infinite were possible, it could not be "formed by successive addition." In addition, Craig
offers two "scientific confirmations" of premise (2) - considerations having
to do with Big Bang cosmology and with the second law of thermodynamics. Finally, Craig offers a supplementary argument for saying that the
cause of the universe is a person.
In the present paper, I shall operate on the assumption that Craig's
philosophical arguments for premise (2) are sound, and that an actually infinite series of successive past events is metaphysically impossible. These
matters are highly controversial, but in this paper I want to focus attention
on the problems that emerge when we ask, "Did the First Cause exist in
time prior to creation?" Although Craig's preferred position seems to be
that God creates time along with the universe and is not in time "prior" to
creation, he thinks it does not matter to the success of the kalam argument
how he answers this question; he thinks he can live with either answer. [See
RF 94.] I shall endeavor to show that Craig is mistaken about this, and that
a negative answer is not compatible with all the requirements of the kalam
argument, leaving to another time the question whether the argument fares
better on the alternative assumption that God is in time prior to creation.!
In the first part of the paper, I consider the implications for the kalam
argument of the suggestion that time is created along with the universe,
and that the First Cause is not in time prior to creation. I try to show that
premise (1) loses much of its plausibility when it is applied to the beginning of time itself. In the second part, I briefly consider Craig's supplementary argument for saying that only a personal agent could be the cause
of the universe. I try to show that this argument cannot be sustained if (as
Craig believes) God's will to create is timeless.
Part I: Must the universe have a cause?
In his earliest presentations of the kalam argument, Craig held that God
is timeless prior to creation, and this still seems to be his preferred position.
It seems to me that prior to creation God is outside time, or rather

there is no time at all. For time cannot exist unless there is change.
And prior to creation God would have to be changeless .
. .. in my opinion, God was timeless prior to creation, and He created
time along with the world. From that point on God places himself
within time so that He can interact with the world He has created.
[PSPC 197-8]
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On this view, God has no temporal duration at all "prior" to creation not even everlasting temporal duration. But in creating the universe God
creates time as well, and in so doing puts himself into time "so that he can
interact with the world." Qua creator of the temporal universe, God is
eternal in the sense of "atemporal." But now that there is a temporal universe, God exists at every time - past, present, and future.
Difficult questions can be raised about the logical coherence of this picture. What can it mean to say that "prior" to the beginning of the universe
God was outside of time? Craig makes it sound as if God "used to be" outside of time, but "then" he created the world and put himself into time. But
this can't be right if there is no time prior to the beginning of the universe.
Ordinarily, when we ascribe logically incompatible properties to something, we do so on the understanding that the thing has them at different
times. Since that move is not available here, we seem to be left with the
implication that God is - timelessly - both temporal and non-temporal. In
order to resolve this tension, advocates of the kalam argument must say
that God is causally, but not temporally, prior to the universe. Thus he can
be atemporal in one respect - "qua cause of the universe" - and temporal in
another - "qua acting in human history," perhaps.
If this is right, then causal priority must not be understood (as it often
is) to require temporal priority. Advocates of the kalam argument may
reject such an account on the ground that it is perfectly intelligible to suppose that causes are sometimes simultaneous with their effects. Of course,
simultaneity is also a temporal relation, and one might still wonder whether
the idea of a completely atemporal cause of temporal phenomena makes
sense. But rather than pursue that line of thought here, I shall agree to
operate on the assumption that causation by an atemporal being is at least
intelligible. My main concern lies elsewhere. I shall argue, first, that
Craig's defense of the causal principle on which the kalam argument restspremise (1) - is considerably weakened by this way of understanding
God's relation to time; and second, that his argument for saying that the
cause of the universe must be a person lacks cogency if we suppose that
the universe is caused by a timeless being.

I.A. What is it for something to "begin to exist?"
It will be recalled that premise (1) says that whatever begins to exist must
have a cause. But what, exactly, is it for something to "begin to exist?"
Philosophers as diverse as Griinbaum and Swinburne have suggested that
a thing does not begin to exist unless there is an earlier time at which it did
not exist. If they are right, then the absence of time prior to the beginning
of the universe would entail that it did not begin to exist, in which case
Craig's premise (1) would not require that the universe have a cause.
Craig is not impressed by this objection. Responding to Griinbaum, he
writes:
Imagine that the temporal instants prior to a performance of
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony were non-existent. Should we say that
the symphony concert then fails to have a beginning, even though it
is precisely the same concert as that which is contingently preceded
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by temporal moments? ... The fact that x begins to exist ought to
leave the question of existents prior to x altogether open.
[SCA237]
Craig then offers the following definition:

'x begins to exist' =def 'x exists at t and there is no time immediately
prior to t at which x exists. '[SCA 238]
If this analysis is accepted, it will of course follow that the universe
''begins to exist" even if there is no time prior to that beginning. But is it true
that whatever ''begins to exist" in this broader sense must have a cause?
I.B. Could something come from nothing?
Craig says that premise (1) is "based on the metaphysical intuition that
something cannot come out of nothing" - a principle that he believes no
reasonable person could reject.

Does anyone in his right mind really believe that, say, a raging tiger
could suddenly come into existence uncaused, out of nothing, in this
room right now? The same applies to the universe: if prior to the
existence of the universe, there was absolutely nothing - no God, no
space, no time - how could the universe possibly have come to exist?
[RF 93, my emphasis]
... if originally there were absolutely nothing - no God, no space, no
time -, then how could the universe possibly come to exist? The
truth of the principle ex nihilo, nihil fit is so obvious that I think we are
justified in foregoing an elaborate defense of the argument's first premiss. [EGBU, my emphasis]
Unfortunately, it is difficult either to formulate a clear statement of this
principle, or to see exactly how it is supposed to support premise (1).
Let us begin our investigation of this principle by asking what Craig
means by the words "originally" and "prior to" in the passages quoted
above. He can hardly mean" once upon a time before the beginning of the
universe," since on the view he is defending, there is no time prior to the
beginning of the universe. Sometimes Craig formulates his "metaphysical
intuition" without the temporal sounding word, "originally."
. . . if nothing existed - no matter, no energy, no space, no time, no
deity - if there were absolutely nothing, then it seems unintelligible
to say that something should spring into existence. [TABBC 146]
Since there is no time in the "nothing" under consideration, the phrase
"springing into existence" must be understood in such a way that it does
not entail a change in some already existing situation. But stripped of all temporal sounding language, Craig's "metaphysical intuition" says only this:

If nothing existed, then nothing could exist.
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Presumably the "could" in question is the "could" of logical or metaphysical necessity. But where does the necessity operator go? Does it have
wide scope or narrow scope? Does Craig's principle say this?
Necessarily, if nothing existed then nothing would exist.
Or this?

If nothing existed, then necessarily nothing would exist.

On the wide scope interpretation, Craig's principle is a trivial analytic truth,
from which nothing of interest follows. If nothing at all existed, then there
would indeed be nothing at all- not even a "springing into existence." But
this would be so even if the beginning of the universe lacked a cause. It
therefore provides no support for premise (1) of the kalam argument.
What about the narrow scope interpretation? On this reading, the
principle is difficult to interpret. It speaks of nothingness almost as if it
were a "condition" of something. In the unimaginable situation in which
there was absolutely nothing, it would be be impossible for anything to
exist. But this is nonsense. Nothingness is not a "condition" of anything.
It has no power to "prevent" things from "springing into existence." What
we are talking about here, after all, is nothing at all - "no matter, no energy,
no space, no time, no deity." And nothing at all has no power at all, not
even the power to prevent things from existing. One wants to ask Craig,
"If there were nothing at all, what would make it true that nothing could
come into existence?"
It is not surprising, therefore, that Craig sometimes slips back into talking as if the issue were whether something could "spring into existence"
out of a temporally prior nothing. For example, in the following passage,
Craig appeals to the Maimonidean-Thomist principle that "if in the past
nothing existed then nothing would exist now."
... for example, in the Maimonidean-Thomist argument that a necessary being must exist or else given infinite time nothing would exist,
virtually no one ever challenges the premiss that if in the past nothing existed then nothing would exist now. That something should
spring into existence out of nothing is so counter-intuitive that to
attack Maimonides and Aquinas at this point seems to colour one's
intellectual integrity. The old principle ex nihilo nihil fit appears to be
so manifestly true that a sincere denial of this axiom is well-nigh
impossible. [TABBC 58-59, my emphasis]
Since there can hardly be a past state of affairs in which there is no time, it
might look as if Craig here understands the principle, ex nihilo nihil fit, to
mean something like the following.
(WT) If, at a given time, there were nothing at all (apart from time
itself), then at no later time could anything begin to exist.
I am not sure whether it is "metaphysically" possible for time to be the
only "thing" in existence. But even if it isn't possible, (WT) might still be
true in an interesting way. Someone might think it plausible to say that if per impossible - there were a time at which there was absolutely nothing
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else, then in that case, nothing could "begin to exist." That is probably how
Maimonides and Thomas are to be understood.
Unfortunately, this "metaphysical intuition" - even if we have it - does
not force us to accept premise (1) of the kalam argument.' To see why,
recall that on Craig's account, a thing begins to exist at a time t if there is no
time prior to t at which it exists. Recall too that there are two different
ways in which this might be so:

x exists at a time t, and there is a time prior to t at which x does not
exist.
2. x exists at a time t, and there is no time prior to t.

1.

I shall refer to the first of these possibilities as intratemporal "coming to
be," and to the second as extratemporal"coming to be." In order to provide
what is needed for the kalam argument, premise (1) must be understood to
claim that anything that comes to be in either of these senses must have a
cause. But principle (WT) entails only that whatever comes to be within
time must have a cause, leaving open the question what is to be said about
the beginning of time itself.
Is there some other way of reading the traditional formula that nothing
comes from nothing on which it does entail premise (I)? Perhaps there is. If
we read "from" as "caused by," and "comes" as "begins to exist," and do a
little creative rewording, "nothing comes from nothing" amounts to something like this:
(c) Nothing begins to exist if nothing causes it to exist.
(c) does indeed entail premise (1). But that is only because it just is a
variant premise (1). If this is all that Craig means by ex nihilo nihil fit, then
dragging this traditional formula into the discussion merely increases the
likelihood of confusion without providing any legitimate support for the
causal principle required by the argument. If we have to appeal to premise
(1) to explain what it means to say that "nothing comes from nothing," then
surely it would be better to drop the traditional formula altogether, and
stick with the simple assertion that we have a "metaphysical intuition" of
the truth of the proposition that whatever begins to be - either in the
intra temporal or in the extratemporal sense - must have a cause.
At a later point, I will raise serious questions about the claim that there
is a strong "metaphysical intuition" favoring even the claim that what
"comes to be" within time necessarily has a cause. But first I want to attend
to a couple of other small, but significant, points.
I.e. Did God "begin to exist" when he created the world?
The questionable character of Craig's premise (1) becomes even more
obvious when we take note of the fact that on the definition of "begins to
exist" that we have been working with, God himself begins to exist. For in
creating the world, Craig thinks, God both creates time and puts himself
into time. It follows that God, no less than the universe, exists at a time
prior to which there is no time. But then it seems that, on Craig's princi-

MUST THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE HAVE A CLAUSE?

155

pIes, God is as much in need of a cause as the universe.
In order to get around this problem, Craig introduces yet another complication into his analysis of "begins to exist." As amended, it says:

x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists;
and the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless
existence. [EGBU, 237 fn]
It will be recalled that on the present proposal, God is timeless "prior"
to the creation of the universe. If this is what it means to "begin to exist,"
then Craig can consistently deny that God "begins to exist." If God is
timeless prior to creation, then the actual world does contain "a state of
affairs involving God's timeless existence." But now premise (1) must be
understood to mean that everything satisfying this new, elaborate definition of 'begins to exist" must have a cause. Such a claim is not obviously
supported by any widely shared metaphysical intuition.

LD. Creation ex nihilo and the appeal to IImetaphysical intuition"
Another problem with the appeal to "metaphysical intuition" is that
different intuitions pull us in different directions. Some may support the
traditional theistic picture of creation, but others don't. In particular, I
think that creation out of nothing is at least as counterintuitive as is beginning
to exist without a cause.

When I try to conjure up a picture of something - a house, say - "popping into existence" without a cause, it does seem pretty absurd. It may
not be logically impossible, but it is inconsistent with everything I know of
the world in which I live. Houses don't just materialize out of nothing.
They have to be built.
So far, so good. But I don't see how considerations of this sort can he
appealed to by someone who believes in creation ex nihilo. After all, a
house "popping into existence out of nowhere" doesn't seem any less
absurd just because somebody says (or thinks), "Let there be a house
where there was no house."
To say that this is unproblematic when the "somebody" in question is
an omnipotent God is to beg the question against those who doubt that
creation ex nihilo is metaphysically possible. The reason is that on standard
assumptions about the nature of omnipotence, God is not supposed to be
able to do what is metaphysically impossible. If someone insists it is just
"obvious" that God could create a world without any preexisting material
stuff to work with, on the ground that there is no logical contradiction in
the idea of such a feat, then the proper reply is that there is also no logical
contradiction in the idea of the universe beginnillg without a cause.
This point can be expressed quite precisely in terms of Aristotle's distinction between efficient and material causes. When I do the relevant
"thought experiments," I find the absence of a material cause at least as
troubling as the absence of an efficient cause. At the level of raw, untutored, intuition, the idea of something "beginning to be" without an efficient cause does not seem more absurd than that of somebody "making" a
universe out of absolutely nothing.
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I hope it is clear that I am not suggesting that creation ex nihilo is either
logically incoherent or otherwise impossible. 3 Nevertheless, I think the
"intuitive" absurdity of making something "out of" nothing is a near
neighbor of the intuition that something can't "come from" nothing, and
this raises a doubt about the wisdom of relying so heavily on such "intuitions" for the defense of premise (1). Craig may perhaps not unreasonably
be accused of emphasizing "intuitions" that support the picture of creation
he wishes to defend, and neglecting those that don't.
I.E. Is it an a priori intuition?
How are we supposed to evaluate this alleged "metaphysical intuition?" How can we tell whether premise (1) is necessarily true? Craig
says we should not think of it as an empirical generalization, although he
also says that it would fare quite well if we did think of it that way. (More
on this in a bit.) Clearly it is not an analytic truth. The negation of (1) does
not appear to be logically inconsistent - we can conceive tigers and the like
popping into existence uncaused without any obvious contradiction. But
Craig says this has no tendency to show that such things are "really" possible. On the contrary, he claims that we can "see" that it is metaphysically
impossible for anytrung at all to begin to exist without a cause.
It would seem, then, that "metaphysical intuition," as Craig conceives
it, is a source of knowledge that is both synthetic and a priori. In this paper,
I will not challenge the claim that there are some synthetic a priori intuitions.
I will ask only whether, assuming that there are, it is plausible to believe
that premise (1) of the kalam argument is among them.
Do we have an a priori intuition of either of the following claims?
(IT)
(ET)

It is metaphysically impossible for anything to "come to be"
within time without a cause. (Intra temporal coming to be.)
It is metaphysically impossible for time itself to "come to be"
without a cause. (Extratemporal coming to be.)

The position I wish to defend is not that either (IT) or (ET) is false. Rather, I
shall contend that that they are not known a priori to be true.
In section LB. above, I pointed out that (IT) does not logically entail
(ET), and suggested that when it is split off from (IT), it may not be at all
obvious what to say about (ET). We may well feel that we just don't know
what to say about extra temporal coming to be. Now I want to go further
and suggest that we do not have a clear a priori intuition even with regard
to intratemporal coming to be.
One mark of a genuine a priori intuition of a proposition would seem to
be this. If a person clearly understands it, then he "sees" that it must be
true. The proposition has a kind of "luminosity" that makes it impossible
for him not to believe it. A standard example of a non-analytic proposition
that might plausibly be thought to be knowable in this way is:
(RG) "The surface of an object cannot be both red all over and
partly green at one and the same time."
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Let us suppose that we do indeed know that propositions like (RG) are
"metaphysically necessary." And let us suppose further that the source of
this knowledge lies in an a priori intuition. We just "see" that (RG) cannot
be false. If somebody doesn't "see" it, we will conclude that he hasn't paid
proper attention to proposition (RG). He doesn't understand it yet. When
he does, we will expect him to "see" it too.
A second mark of a genuine a priori intuition would seem to be this.
The better we are acquainted with the "intuited" proposition, the more
fully we see what it says and just what is involved in asserting it, the clearer it will be to us that the proposition must be true. It shouldn't be the case
that as we make the distinctions necessary to understand precisely what is
being said, the issue becomes more and more obscure and we become less
and less sure of our judgment.
How does proposition (IT) above fare when we apply these "tests" of
an a priori intuition to it? Is it the case that when we properly attend to it,
we "see" that it is necessarily true? Is it the case that the better we understand what it says, the clearer it is that it cannot be false? Should we join
Craig in refusing to believe that anyone in his right mind could fail to see
that (IT) is true?
At this point we encounter a familiar difficulty. There isn't nearly as
much agreement about (IT) as there is about (RG). Almost everybody who
thinks about it "sees" that (RG) has to be true, whereas some people, many
of them philosophers, report no such intuition of the truth of (IT). Inspired
perhaps by the imagination of David Hume, they have no trouble conceiving a world in which bizarre and unpredictable things happen, a world in
which things pop into existence without their usual causes. They conclude
(perhaps too quickly) that such a world is "metaphysically possible."
Naturally, Craig would insist that such philosophers have mistaken
views about various matters. They may have failed to distinguish clearly
between "what we can conceive without apparent contradiction" and what
is "really or "metaphysically possible." They may also be in the grip of a
false Humean "picture" of what it is for something to have a cause. (In his
book length exchange with Quentin Smith, for example, Craig accuses
Smith of assuming "uncritically" the "positivistic equation between predictability in principle and causation." [TABBC 145])
With regard to the first point, I agree that there is a distinction between
metaphysical possibility and "what we can conceive without apparent contradiction," and that something might be - really - impossible even if we
seem to be able to conceive it without contradiction. Nevertheless, I
believe that the ability to conceive something without apparent contradiction is evidence - albeit defeasible evidence - for its metaphysical possibility. Like most philosophers since Hume, I have no trouble conceiving a
world in which things occasionally pop into existence without cause. (As
long as it doesn't happen too often, it could be a world much like the one
that actually exists.) Such a world may be metaphysically impossible, but
the fact that we do not "see" any contradiction in it must be given some
weight. Unless there is a defeater for this evidence, those who take it at face
value are perfectly within their epistemic rights.
As for the second of these charges, it is perfectly true that if one thinks
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that causes must precede their effects in time, or if one thinks that effects
must be at least in principle predictable from antecedent conditions, then
one will not be able to make much sense of the sort of causation that Craig
thinks is involved in the creation of the universe, and in consequence one
will have grave doubts about the truth of premise (1). What is not true is
that only a characteristically Humean view of causation would produce
doubt about (IT). I myself am inclined to think that our best and clearest (if
not further analyzable!) idea of causation comes from the awareness of our
own exercise of our power to act - a most un-Humean thought!
Nevertheless, I have no clear intuition telling me that "whatever begins to
be" must be caused by something - whether by another event or by an
exercise of "agency."
It is true that the ordinary sized objects of everyday experience do not
pop into or out of existence without causes. But it does not follow that we
know this by way of an a priori intuition that entitles us to generalize about
the way things are in situations utterly dissimilar to those of which we have
experience. For example, I have no intuitions - a priori or otherwise - about
the behavior of subatomic particles, and if the "experts" tell me that the best
theory is one in which chance reigns, then I shall (however provisionally)
operate on the assumption that they are right about this. It is possible, of
course, that the experts are wrong, and that quantum indeterminacy reflects
nothing more than the limits of our ability to take the relevant measurements without disturbing the systems whose properties are being measured. Nevertheless, I do not think we know a priori that this must be so.
Craig's response to the quantum indeterminacy objection is interesting.
He points out that the events in question have necessary causal conditions,
even if those conditions are not jointly SUfficient to produce the effect.
The appearance of a particle in a quantum vacuum may thus be said
to be spontaneous, but cannot properly be said to be absolutely
uncaused, since it has many physically necessary conditions. To be
uncaused in the relevant sense of an absolute beginning, an existent
must lack any non-logical necessary or sufficient conditions whatsoever. [TABBC 146]
This is a somewhat surprising line for Craig to take. One wonders what
he thinks makes a cause out of a bunch of merely necessary conditions.
Apparently not that they are jointly sufficient to produce the effect. What,
then? Some explanation is surely called for. Craig will not want to settle
for so little by way of a cause when he is considering the beginning of the
universe. Why is he willing to do it here?
But even if we accept Craig's suggestion that quantum events are not
"uncaused" in the "relevant sense," this will require a fresh qualification of
premise (1). It will now have to be understood in such a way that it does
not entail that for every beginning there is something sufficient to produce it,
but only that for every beginning there is some "non-logically necessary
condition" without which it could not happen. This makes the question I
am raising now about the supposed a priori status of premise (1) all the
more pressing. If a principle must be qualified on the basis of empirical evi-
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dence, how seriously can we take the claim that it is known by way of an a
priori intuition? (Also, as we shall see later, it considerably weakens the
case Craig makes for saying that the First Cause can only be a person.)
Things become even less clear when we turn from the limited principle
(IT) back to premise (1) of the kalam argument - to the claim that all beginnings to be - whether of the intra- or of the extra-temporal variety - must
have causes. What I have already said about (IT) is true a fortiori for
premise (1). I have no experience of the "origins of worlds," or of times
prior to which there are no other times, and I have no intuitions about
what causal principles would have to hold in a situation so remote from
everyday life. When I compare the beginning of time itself to the particular
beginnings within time of which I have experience, I can only say, "God
knows - I don't."
Thus it is that the more fully I understand and appreciate what is
involved in the causal principle on which Craig's argument rests, the less
obvious it is to me that this principle is a necessary truth. By contrast,
nothing like this happens to me when I examine the claim that something
can't be red all over but somewhere green. The more carefully I consider
that proposition, the clearer it is to me that it must be true. Thus it seems
that (IT) fails our second test for being a genuine a priori intuition.
Add to this the history of discarded a "priori intuitions" - of propositions that once were "clearly and distinctly perceived" to be true, but are
now hardly intelligible, much less "seen" to be true, and the case becomes
even clearer. Anyone who has ever tried explain to students how
Descartes could have "seen" - not merely that there is always a cause - but
that the cause must have as much reality "formally or eminently" in it as
the effect has "objectively" in it, will know what I mean.
I conclude that anyone who claims to have an a priori intuition of
premise (1) must be prepared to explain why other equally well informed
and intelligent persons who have attended closely to (I), made all the relevant distinctions, and clearly understood what it says, nevertheless fail to
"see" that it is true. If it is so obvious, how can they fail to "see" it? 4
How might Craig deal with this problem? To judge from his very brief
statements on the subject, he appears to think that no one sincerely believes
that the beginning of the universe might not have had a cause.
The old principle ex nihilo nihil fit appears to be so manifestly true
that a sincere denial of this axiom is well-nigh impossible. [TABBC
59, my emphasis]
The idea that anything, especially the whole universe, could just
pop into existence uncaused is so repugnant that most thinkers intuitively recognize that the universe's beginning to exist entirely
uncaused out of nothing is incapable of sincere affirmation. [TABBC
57, my emphasis]
It is true that if a person is confused by loose talk of things "popping
into existence out of nothing," she may be tempted to suppose that we
have something like an a priori intuition of premise (1). But once the relevant distinctions have been made, many philosophers would deny that
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they "intuitively recognize" anything of the sort. Craig, however, seems to
think that such persons are (i) in a minority and (ii) insincere. Taking issue
with John Mackie, for example, he rhetorically asks: "Does Mackie sincerely
believe that things can pop into existence uncaused, out of nothing?" [RF
93, my emphasis]
I don't suppose that Craig thinks Mackie was lying when he questioned
the first premise of the lazZam argument. But perhaps he thinks that Mackie
was self-deceived - that he had talked himself into affirming something
that, "deep down," he knew to be false. If so, we have a new question:
How could the likes of John Mackie talk themselves into denying a self-evident principle? Craig's answer appears to be that such persons deny
premise (1) in order to avoid having to believe in a Creator.
Nevertheless, some thinkers, exercised to avoid the theism implicit
in this premiss within the present context, have felt driven to deny
its truth in order to avoid its theistic implications. [EGBU]
One might suppose that such statements are mere rhetorical excess on
Craig's part, and do not reflect his real position. This would probably be a
mistake. Many Christian intellectuals - taking their cue from the first
chapter of Paul's letter to the Romans - hold that God has made his existence so "plain" in the works of nature that we are completely "without
excuse" if we do not believe in him. Craig himself apparently thinks that
one of the goals of Christian apologetics is to deprive unbelievers of any
excuse by inviting them to see just how "plain" God's existence is in the
things he has made.
Christian apologist E. J. Carnell pointed out that one of the purposes
of apologetics is to remove from the unbeliever any just excuse for his
not repenting before God. That objective is achieved so long as the
unbeliever is presented sound theistic arguments with substantiated
premises for which he has no adequately warranted defeater, even if
he refuses to believe those premises. [IDKA 238]
If, after listening carefully to all of Craig's arguments, an intelligent and
well-informed person still doesn't believe, Craig apparently thinks it is
clear that the fault lies, not with his arguments, but with those who have
"refused" to be convinced by them.

Dialectical success in natural theology cannot be equated with convincing one's opponent (or even forcing him to revise his beliefs);
after all, many will simply refuse to be convinced. All sorts of psychological and spiritual factors come into play here for which a
philosopher cannot be held responsible. [IDKA 238]
It is not hard to guess what "psychological and spiritual factors" Craig
likely has in mind. Prideful rebellion against God - a sinful desire to run
one's own life without divine guidance or assistance - is often alleged to be
the wellspring of unbelief.
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'This is not the place for a full dress review of the clabn that all unbelievers have dishonest and unworthy motives. I will limit myself to two brief
comments.
First, it is worth noting such an "explanation" could be accepted only by
someone who was already convinced that God exists, and of a lot of other
things as well. From outside the evangelical Christian world view, this is
bound to look like an ad hoc hypothesis that merely adds to the implausibility of an already top-heavy theory. No matter how much "scriptural
support" is cited in its favor, the outsider, who does not yet accept this kind
of "support," is perfectly justified, from his own point of view, in seeing
this attack on his integrity as little more than a lame attempt to reassure
believers in the face of recalcitrant data.
While it is true that the remarks quoted above are not addressed to outsiders, the kalam argument is offered to them as one reason (among others)
for "coming inside." So the facts to which I have called attention remain a
serious problem for the apologetic use of that argument. Whatever the insider may think, the outsider still needs to understand how it is that intelligent
and well-informed people can disagree about matters that are supposed to
be intuitively self-evident.
My second comment is that my own experience - of both unbelief and
unbelievers - suggests that the proposed "explanation" is false. It tells me
that there are lots and lots of perfectly honest unbelievers who are quite
sincerely troubled by what they see as a lack of evidence. They would like
to believe in God, but can't because they think the evidence does not support it.
Craig would undoubtedly disagree me here. In another context, he says
that the Holy Spirit reveals the truth to the unbeliever, convicting him "of
his own sin, of God's righteousness, and of his condemnation before God.
The unbeliever so convicted can therefore be said to know such truths as
'God exists,' 'I am guilty before God,' and so forth." [RF 35] And lest we
should suppose that Craig is speaking only of some unbelievers, he goes on
to say:
. . . when a person refuses to come to Christ it is never just because
of lack of evidence or because of intellectual difficulties: at root, he
refuses to come because he willingly ignores and rejects the drawing
of God's Spirit on his heart. No one in the final analysis really fails to
become a Christian because of a lack of arguments; he fails to become
a Christian because he loves darkness rather than light and wants
nothing to do with God. [RF 35-6, my emphasis]
'This simply does not square with my own observation of unbelievers,
many of whom appear to have very real intellectual difficulties with
Christianity. Even if Craig's arguments are better than they (and I) suppose, it is preposterous to suggest that their judgment has been clouded by
a "love of darkness" or by a deep unwillingness to believe in God. Some of
them are exceptionally honest, clear-headed, and humble. Some of them
actually hope that God exists.
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I.F. Can it be justified empirically?
If premise (1) isn't known by a priori intuition, perhaps it is known in
some other way. Craig sometimes suggests that even if we treat it as an
empirical claim, the evidence strongly supports it.
The causal proposition could be defended as an empirical generalization
based on the widest sampling of experience. The empirical evidence in
support of the proposition is absolutely overwhelming, so much so that
Humean empiricists could demand no stronger evidence in support of
any synthetic statement. . . . Constantly verified and never falsified,
the causal proposition may be taken as an empirical generalization
enjoying the strongest support experience affords. [TABBC p 61]
I'm not sure what Craig would be prepared to count as a genuine "falsification" of premise (1). Presumably "looking hard and failing to discover a
cause" would not do the trick. If no conceivable observation would refute
the principle, the absence of falsification does nothing to establish the empirical credentials of this principle.
What about the "constant verification" of premise (I)? What does it consist
in? Is it that we always see what the cause of something is? Presumably not.
We don't always know what the cause of something is. Is it that we always
find causes when we look for them? Hardly. Sometimes we fail. Is it that we
often find causes when we look for them? This is certainly true, but at best it
supports a claim considerably weaker than the one Craig wants to make.
An even more serious problem with this way of defending premise (1)
is that the "observed cases" may not be a representative sample of the
whole territory. After all, the only "comings to be" of which we have experience involve intra temporal corning to be, whereas the sweeping generalization Craig wants us to draw from this evidence concerns all comings to be
- whether of the intratemporal or of the extramundane sort. Is the "corning to
be" of a mushroom, say, relevantly similar to the "corning to be" of time?
Is it likely that a metaphysical principle that holds for former holds for the
latter? Is the presence or absence of a temporal context completely irrelevant to the need for a cause? It is far from obvious that the answers to
these questions will be the ones required by the kalam argument.
Finally, it should be noted how "two-edged" the empirical argument for
premise (1) is. Lots of empirical generalizations are prima facie at least as
well established as the one Craig endorses, and some of them are incompatible with the requirements of the kalam argument. Consider the following:
EGl.

In our experience, something isn't be made out of nothing.
Whenever something comes into existence, some previously existing "stuff" has been given a new "shape."
Therefore something is never made of nothing.

EG2.

In our experience, causes always bear a temporal relation to
their effects. They are either temporally prior to, or perhaps
simultaneous with, their effects. Therefore causes always
bear a temporal relation to their effects.
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Surely the conclusions of EG1 and EG2 are" constantly confirmed," and
"never falsified," by empirical observation? But if the conclusion of EG1 it
true, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is false; and if the conclusion of EG2
is true, God must be in time in order to cause the beginning of the universe. Presumably Craig would want to say that EG1 and EG2 are bad
arguments. But how are they bad? If we say that the relation of God to the
created world is not relevantly analogous to intramundane causation, this
will be an equally strong objection to the "empirical" case for premise (1) of
the kalam argument.

Part II
Must the cause of the universe be a person?
Craig believes, not only that the kalam argument establishes that the
universe has a cause, but also that there is a strong argument for the saying
that this cause must be a person. Here are two representative passages in
which Craig states this argument.
. . . In fact, I think that it can be plausibly argued that the cause of
the universe must be a personal Creator. For how else could a temporal effect arise from an eternal cause? If the cause were simply a
mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions
existing from eternity, then why would not the effect also exist from
eternity? For example, if the cause of water's being frozen is the temperature's being below zero degrees, then if the temperature were
below zero degrees from eternity, then any water present would be
frozen from eternity. The only way to have an eternal cause but a temporal effect would seem to be if the cause is a personal agent who freely chooses
to create an effect in time. For example, a man sitting from eternity may
will to stand up; hence, a temporal effect may arise from an eternally
existing agent. Indeed, the agent may will from eternity to create a
temporal effect, so that no change in the agent need be conceived.
Thus, we are brought not merely to the first cause of the universe, but
to its personal Creator. [EGBU, my emphasis]
... The cause is in some sense eternal and yet the effect which it produced is not eternal, but began to exist a finite time ago. How can this
be? If the necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of
the effect are eternal, then why isn't the effect eternal? How can all the
causal conditions sufficient for the production of the effect be changelessly
existent and yet the effect not also be existent along with the cause? How
can the cause exist without the effect? ... How can a first event come
to exist if the cause of that event exists changelessly and eternally?
Why isn't the effect as coeternal as the cause? ... It seems that there is
only one way out of this dilemma, and that is to infer that the cause of
the universe is a personal agent who chooses to create a universe in
time. [RF 117, my emphasis]
Craig seems to be thinking along the following lines. There are just two
kinds of cause - personal causes and non-personal ones. Non-personal
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causes are causally sufficient for their effects. A temperature below freezing is Craig's example of a non-personal cause. It cannot fail to freeze
whatever water happens to be around. Personal causes, on the other hand,
are individual persons who freely decide to bring about this or that state of
affairs. A man freely choosing to stand up at a certain time is an example
of a personal cause. If the man (rather than some state of the man) is the
cause of his standing up, then obviously the cause can exist without producing its effect.
Like many libertarians, Craig distinguishes between agent" causes and
"event" causes. An "agent" can exist for as long as you please without producing a particular effect that she is nevertheless able to produce at any time.
The mere existence of the cause (the agent) is not sufficient for its effect. By
contrast, a non-personal cause is sufficient for its effect. And a cause (the
temperature being below zero centigrade, for example) that is sufficient for
an effect cannot exist without producing that effect (frozen water).
If this distinction is accepted, Craig thinks he can show that the cause of
the beginning of the universe must be a person. The reason is that a nonpersonal cause, existing from eternity, would have produced its effect from eternity. In which case, the universe would always have existed. Since we know
that the universe has not always existed (it has a beginning), and since we
also know that its cause is eternal, Craig thinks it follows that the cause of
the universe must be personal. The argument may be outlined as follows:
U

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

£.

It has been shown that the universe has not always existed.

The cause of the universe must be eternal. (Otherwise it, too,
would have a beginning and would require a cause.)
The cause of the universe must be either a personal agent or a
non-personal sufficient condition.
If a "causal condition sufficient for the production" of the universe exists "from eternity," then the universe has always existed.
So the cause of the universe is not a non-personal sufficient
condition.
The cause of the universe must therefore be a person.

There are several problems here.
First, it is doubtful that Craig can consistently endorse premise (c) of
this argument. When responding to the quantum indeterminacy objection
to premise (1) of the kalam argument, Craig interprets his causal principle
in such a way that it requires only that there be one or more necessary conditions for any "coming to be."
The appearance of a particle in a quantum vacuum may thus be said
to be spontaneous, but cannot properly be said to be absolutely
uncaused, since it has many physically necessary conditions. To be
uncaused in the relevant sense of an absolute beginning, an existent
must lack any non-logical necessary or sufficient conditions whatsoever. [TABBC 146]
Presumably Craig would have to agree that non-personal conditions
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that are only necessary for some effect could exist from eternity without
producing that effect. So the alternatives - either an eternally sufficient
condition or an eternal personal agent - are not (according to Craig's own
position) the only logical possibilities.
Second, it is doubtful that postulating a personal cause will enable
Craig to escape the conclusion that the world must be just as eternal as its
cause. It will do so only if no eternal state of that agent is causally sufficient
for the existence of the world. For on Craig's principles, that should be
enough to make the world eternal. That much is entailed by premise (d) of
my outline of Craig's argument.
Now this condition might hold in the case of "a man sitting from eternity" who decides, at some time, to exercise his power to stand. The man,
we may suppose, has not always had the intention to stand up. But this
easy answer will not do if the first cause is identified with God. God, after
all, "knows from eternity" what God is going to do. So it seems that he
must "have the intention" of creating the universe "from eternity." On
standard views about God, his will is causally sufficient for the existence of
the universe. So, one may well ask Craig, why doesn't it follow that the
universe exists "from eternity?"
Craig does not deny that God intention to create is eternal. He explains:
. . . God could exist changelessly and eternally but choose to create
the world in time. By "choose" one need not mean that the Creator
changes his mind about the decision to create, but that He freely and
eternally intends to create a world with a beginning. By exercising
his causal power, he therefore brings it about that a world with a
beginning comes to exist. So the cause is eternal, but the effect is not.
[RF 117]
This is much too easy. God's eternal decision to create a universe must
surely be causally sufficient for the existence of that world. So if, as Craig
indicates in this passage, God's will to create is eternal, why doesn't he
conclude, in line with principle (d) above, that the universe is eternal?
But doesn't Craig say that what God "eternally wills" is to create "a
world with a beginning?" And doesn't this entail that the world he creates
is not eternal? Indeed it does, but this merely makes me wonder whether
Craig is not committed to an inconsistent set of propositions. To see why,
let alpha be the world God has chosen to create. From:

alpha has a beginning;
(ii) God's willing-to-create-alpha is eternal;
(iii) God's willing-to-create-alpha is causally sufficient for the existence of alpha;
(iv) if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of some
thing, then that thing is also eternal [from principle (d) above ];

(i)

and
(v)

if a thing is eternal then it does not have a beginning;
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it follows that

(vi)

alpha both does and does not have a beginning.

Something has to give. But what? (i) is a bedrock feature of Craig's position. No theist with standard views about God would want to deny (iii).
And however we define "eternity," (v) is an uncontroversial analytic truth.
What about (ii)? Maybe it was a mistake for Craig to say that God's will
to create is eternal? I don't think so. On the standard view of creation ex
nihilo, God creates just by "willing." He says, "let it be so," and it is so.
God's will to set time in motion by creating alpha is therefore causally prior
to the existence - and thus to the beginning - of time itself. From this it is a
very short step to the conclusion that God's will to create alpha is eternal.
But what about (iv)? Perhaps Craig could say that God's eternally-willing-to-create-a-world-with-a-beginning merely makes it eternally true that
there "is" a world with a beginning, while denying that it makes the world
eternal. There may be something to this idea, but I do not see how Craig
can make use of it in the present context. The reason is that it can just as
easily be deployed on behalf of an eternal but non-personal cause, whereas
the main thrust of Craig's argument is that there is a clear difference
between the implications of an eternal personal cause and those of an eternal non-personal cause. If an eternal state of a person can be causally sufficient for "there being a world with a beginning," why not an eternal state
of a non-person? If Craig rejects (iv) on these grounds, his rationale for saying that the world would always have existed if it had been caused by an
eternal non-person vanishes.
Something has gone very badly wrong. But what? Part of the answer
may be that Craig's argument moves back and forth between two opposed
conceptions of eternity: eternity as timelessness, and eternity as beginningless and endless temporal duration. When he says that God is "causally
prior" to the existence of time itself, he is thinking in terms of a timeless
First Cause. But when he says that God wills from eternity to produce a
world with a beginning in time, he is at least implicitly thinking in terms of
beginningless and endless duration. Here's why.
A personal agent existing in time can have plans for the future. If God's
existence prior to creation is a temporal priority, he can always, prior to creation, have willed that a world should come into existence at a later time.
What God wills to create need not lack a beginning just because God has
always intended to create it. Just as Socrates can sit for a long time, intending to stand up at a certain time, so an everlasting God can have intended
"from eternity" to create the universe at a certain time.
It is just at this point that Craig sees a difference between personal causes
and non-personal ones. If the temperature is below zero centigrade, that is
sufficient to freeze any water that happens to be around. The temperature
cannot "wait" to exercise its power to freeze. If the temperature had always
been below zero, any water that existed would always have been frozen.
I am not certain how real this difference is. If God can have willed
"from eternity" that there be a world with a beginning in time, why couldn't a non-personal cause have been sufficient "from eternity" for the exis-

MUST THE BEGINNING OF THE UNWERSE HA VE A CLAUSE?

167

tence of a world with a beginning in time? Must non-personal sufficient
conditions always produce their effects straightaway? Is" action at a distance" in time more difficult to understand than "action at a distance" in
space? Why should we think that non-personal causes are different in this
respect from sufficient conditions involving the will of a personal agent?
These questions are difficult enough to answer when we are thinking of
eternity as beginningless duration. But when we switch over to Craig's
preferred understanding of eternity, the alleged difference between a personal sufficient condition and a non-personal one disappears completely.
A timeless personal agent timelessly wills to create a world with a beginning, or else does not so will. There can be no temporal gap between the
time at which it does the willing and the time at which the thing willed
actually happens. In this respect a timeless personal cause is no different
from a non-personal cause.
To see this, suppose that a timeless and non-personal cause, s, is causally sufficient for the existence of a physical universe, alpha, having a temporal duration of thirty billion years. Suppose further that the beginning of
alpha coincides with the beginning of time, so that alpha "comes into being"
only in the extratemporal sense. Craig's argument is supposed to show us
that this is impossible. If s is really eternal, then alpha cannot have a beginning. Why not? Because no matter when alpha begins, s would already
have produced it.
It is at just this point that Craig'S argument breaks down. Since there is
no time in eternity, the argument cannot get a grip on it. From the point of
view of eternity, there no time at which alpha does not yet exist.
Consequently, there is no time at which s has failed to produce alpha, and
no time at which s would already have produced alpha. In short, we have
been given no reason to think that an atemporal cause - regardless of
whether it involves a person - could not be sufficient for the existence of a
universe with a temporal beginning.
I conclude that Craig's argument for saying that the (timeless) cause of
the universe is a person must be deemed a failure. It moves back and forth
between the two conceptions of eternity - eternity as beginningless and
endless temporal duration and eternity as timelessness, helping itself to
whichever one suits the needs of his argument at the moment. When
Craig wants to show that the cause of the universe cannot be an eternal
non-person, he conjures up an image of a cause existing throughout an
infinite past and refraining from producing its effect - only a person, he
says, could do that -, seemingly forgetting that eternal (atemporal) causes
have no temporal duration at all, and thus no past.
Craig may think that all non-personal causes are temporal, and that
only a personal cause could be atemporal. But (i) this point has not been
established; (ii) the idea of an atemporal person is at least as puzzling as that
of an atemporal non-person, and it is far from obvious that the personal
has any advantage over the non-personal in this respect; and (iii) if Craig is
operating on the assumption that only a person could be atemporal, it is
hard to see why he bothers with the roundabout argument that he actually
gives for saying that the atemporal cause of the universe must be person.
Even if it cannot be established that the atemporal first cause must be a
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person, it might still be thought that the hypothesis of a personal cause has
certain advantages. It might be said that we have some notion of what an
atemporal person might have reason to do, but no idea at all about what an
atemporal non-person would or wouldn't do. If there is an atemporal
God, then perhaps he would create in order to express his love, or because
he loves variety or beauty, or for some other reason. On the other hand, it
is hard to know how to think about the non-personal alternative. Who
knows what an atemporal non-person would or would not be likely to do?5
If this line of thought could be sustained, then perhaps Craig's reasoning could be repackaged as an inductive argument. Given that the world
has an atemporal cause, we might ask, which is it more likely to be? A personal cause? Or a non-personal one? We have no experience of either. But
if the idea of an atemporal person capable of bringing the universe into
existence is (at least somewhat) more understandable than that of an atemporal non-person - if there is a story that can be told in the former case, but
not in the latter, about why a powerful atemporal being might create a universe - then perhaps we have some reason to prefer a personal explanation
to a non-personal one.
How strong such a reason would be, and whether it would be strong
enough to warrant the judgment that the atemporal cause of the universe is a
person, depends on the answers to a number of difficult questions. Is the
idea of an atemporal personal cause significantly more intelligible than that
of an atemporal non-personal cause? Just how more likely is it that an
atemporal person would bring a universe into being that that an atemporal
cause would do so? Is our preference for a personal cause based on anything deeper than the fact that we are so much more familiar with the
thinkers of the Western theological tradition than with those of the East?
With the Bible than with the Upanishads? These are good questions, but
they lie beyond the scope of this paper.

Conclusion
Where does all of this leave us? At the very least, I think it must be conceded that the 1mlam argument is not as simple and straightforward as it
initially appears to be. Its underpinnings are at least as complicated, and at
least as controversial, as those of any other cosmological argument. When
applied to the beginning of time, the principle that whatever begins to exist
must have a cause is not dearly true. And even if it could be shown that
the first event in the history of the universe has a cause it is not at all obvious that this cause must be a person.6
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NOTES

1. Since God has no beginning, it might appear that if God is in time prior
to creation, then God exists throughout an actually infinite past. Craig thinks
this does not follow. Appealing to the work of Swinburne and Padgett, he suggests that God's life prior to creation could consist in a single beginningless
and undifferentiated "moment," in which case there would not be an actual
infinity of such moments. I am not persuaded that such a moment could count
as a time, but that is a topic for another paper.
2. Of course, it might still be evidence for the truth of premise (I), but only
if the case for premise (1) is broadly inductive. For more on this possibility, see
section I.F. below.
3. I am also well aware that the kalam argument is not an argument for a
first material cause, but rather an argument for a first efficient cause.
(Notwithstanding the title of one of Craig's articles on the kalam argument!)
4. I stress again that this is not meant to be an argument for the falsity of
(I), but only as a reason for thinking that Craig cannot legitimately claim that
we know that this is so on the basis of a priori intuition.
5.
This line of thought was suggested to me by the editor of Faith and

Philosophy.
6. I want to thank Michael Tooley for reading an early draft of this paper
and giving me his critical comments. They have enabled me to see a number
of things much more clearly. I would also like to thank Thomas Rauchenstein,
Jeff Lowder, and Gary Nowlin for stimulating comments and criticisms made
in an e-mail list to which we were all subscribed. Last, but not least, I would
like to thank the editor and the three readers for Faith and Philosophy for their
very helpful criticisms and suggestions.

